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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
STEPHEN ROBERT JONES, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 44994 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2016-22597 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Jones failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing a unified sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed, upon his guilty 
plea to felony eluding a police officer, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence? 
 
 
Jones Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Jones pled guilty to felony eluding a police officer, and the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed.  (R., pp.53-54.)  Jones filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.61-64.)  He also filed a timely 
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Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (Motion for 
Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion 
(Augmentation).)    
Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence in light of his substance abuse, desire for treatment, mental health issues, support of 
family and friends, and purported remorse.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.)  Jones has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of 
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed 
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  State 
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant 
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  Id.  The 
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when 
deciding upon the sentence.  Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of 
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).  “In 
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits 
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).    
The maximum prison sentence for felony eluding a police officer is five years.  I.C. §§ 
49-1404(2), 18-112.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three and 
one-half years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.53-54.)  Jones’ sentence 
is not excessive in light of his ongoing criminal thinking and his failure to rehabilitate while in 
the community.   
Jones’ criminal record started when he was just 12 years old when he was arrested for 
petit theft, and has continued throughout his life.  (PSI, pp.5-15.)  Over time he has acquired six 
felony convictions and 27 misdemeanor convictions, has been on probation “four or five times,” 
has completed three retained jurisdiction programs, and has been incarcerated twice.  (PSI, 
pp.14-15.)  Jones did not do well on probation, as he admitted violating the conditions of his 
release by absconding, drinking, and associating with other felons.  (PSI, pp.14-15.)  He also did 
not do well while incarcerated, admitting he received disciplinary actions for “about four” fights, 
two of which he instigated because he “lost [his] cool.”  (PSI, p.15.)  Jones was released from 
prison in September 2016.  (PSI, p.14.)  Just two months later – and despite the multitude of 
prior legal sanctions, opportunities on probation, rehabilitative programs and outpatient treatment 
opportunities he received – Jones chose to endanger the community by driving the wrong way on 
a highway, failing to stop when an officer activated his emergency lights and siren, and striking 
another vehicle.  (PSI, pp.4-15, 21.) 
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its 
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Jones’ sentence.  (3/3/17 Tr., p.34, L.15 – 
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p.36, L.1 (Appendix A).)  The state submits that Jones has failed to establish that his sentence is 
excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing 
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)  
Jones next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence because he has not been able to start programming.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)  If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of 
the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 
(2007).  To prevail on appeal, Jones must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 
motion.”  Id.  Jones has failed to satisfy his burden.   
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Jones merely stated that he was unable to immediately 
access programming because his fixed time is too long and offenders closer to parole eligibility 
are given priority.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8)  Jones’ complaint that he cannot participate in 
treatment until he nears completion of the determinate portion of his sentence is not new 
information that entitles him to a reduction of sentence.  The district court was aware, at the time 
of sentencing, of Jones’ desire to participate in programming, and it is not “new” information 
that prisoners are most often placed in such treatment nearer to their date of parole eligibility.  
(PSI, p.37.)  Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more properly 
framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.”  State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion).  Because Jones presented no 
new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his 
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sentence is excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis 
for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.   
In denying Jones’ Rule 35 motion, the district court noted that “Mr. Jones has been on 
three previous riders, that this was his seventh felony, and there were some 28 misdemeanors.”  
(7/7/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-18.)  The district court considered all of the relevant information and 
appropriately concluded that Jones’ sentence “was fair and just in this matter.”  (7/7/17 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.19-20.)  Jones has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he 
has not been able to begin any kind of programming.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, 
Jones has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 
motion for a reduction of sentence. 
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Jones’ conviction and sentence and the 
district court’s order denying Jones’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
       
 DATED this 20th day of November, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
      Paralegal 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November, 2017, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 1 driving. 
2 They tried to pull me over. I crashed Into a 
3 ditch. After crashing Into that dttch, that's klnd of 
4 where I came to, where, you know, I rolled off the curb. 
S Before I could ha the brakes, I bumped into a truck 
6 that waa In front of me meybe at like 5 mUea an hour. 
7 I, in no way, want to minimize anything that 
8 happened that njght. I want to sit here today and I 
9 want to take accountability for wt happened. and I 
10 want to make the steps necessary to change that. 
11 The Geneals process, the Alliance, NA. paying 
12 restitlJUon, paying my fines, paying it back to society, 
13 that's lltlo I am. Thal's what I want to do. That's - I 
14 just - I beg of you to give me an opportunity on 
15 probation and to show you that I can do It. and thara, 
16 you know, tha best thing for me at this time. Thank 
17 you, your Honor. I apologize that I took so long, 
18 but ... 
33 
19 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jones. The Court's 
20 reviewed the PSI and the Court flnda that the defendant 
21 had an opportunity lo read the PSI and discuss it with 
22 counsel and make any changes thereto. The Court flnda 
23 the defendant had 811 opportunity to make a statement to 
24 the Cour1 end has done so. 
25 The Court's considered the recommendations of 
1 the prosecuting attorney, thoae cootained in the PSI, 
2 and those of defenae counsel. 11 there any legal reason 
3 why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced at 
4 thistime? 
5 MS, McCLINTON: No, your Honor. 
8 MR. NAFTZ: No, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, tt Is hereby ordered 
8 and It Is the judgment of this Court that after you have 
9 been advised of and waived your conatttutlonal rights to 
10 trial by Jury, to remain silent. to confront witnaaaea, 
11 and having pied guilty to the aimes of driving under 
12 the influence, In this Instance a misdemeanor, and the 
13 charge of eluding of a police officer, that thla Court 
14 finds you guity of thoae crimes. 
15 Mr. Jones, you heard me talk earlier today 
16 about the factors of aantllllClng, the first being 
17 protectlon of society. And the Court looke al your 
18 record, the Court looka at the tact of that you've had 
19 three rldera, and it's a huge factor of p,otec:ting 
20 society. You were driving on the wrong side of the road 
21 In the dark of night; la that correct? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
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23 THE COURT: Okay. That somebody could have -
24 I'm - 81 weM as tm sure you are and the victims io 
25 this case, I'm glad that there are no other victims In 
1 lhla caaa. 
2 The Cour1 then looks to rehabilitation. The 
3 Court - that yolive ~ on three riders before, that 
4 lhia la your seventh felony pursuant to your counsel's 
5 count. There's 28 misdemeanors In Ihle caN. And the 
6 Court has trouble finding you to be aubject to 
7 rehab!lllatlon based upon your whole record. 
8 The Court also looks at the deterrent faciora, 
9 the fact that you need to be detened from this action 
10 as well as aocleCy, And the Court looks a1 what to do 
11 v.ilh a ae'lell-time felon who's been on three riders. And 
12 finally, the Court looka at punishment, which, over a 
13 penod ct time and your record, this case requires soma 
14 punishment. 
15 Taking that all ln1o account, the Court is 
18 aentencing you lo - on the charge of eluding a police 
17 officer, to a aantenai of three and a halfyeara filled 
18 plus one and a half years Indeterminate fot a unified 
19 sentence of five yeara. 
20 And, Mr. Jones, the Court is compelled to 
21 in,pose that sentence. Having been recently releaaed 
22 from prison, you would have thought that you would have 
23 taken a dlffetent track and not been uaing In lhla caae. 
24 And the Court takea no joy In there. There Is nevec any 
25 joy In aending somebody to prison, but the Court's 
1 oompeUed to do so. 
2 As to the charge of - the dtivfng under the 
3 Influence. I'm going to simply sentence you for 98 days 
4 and give you credrt for 98 days, and I wil suspend your 
5 driver's ticense for the period of 90 daya beginning 
6 today. 
7 /vJ far as any restitution, you say you don't 
8 have thoaa figures? 
9 MS. McCLINTON: I don't, Judge. Ill could 
10 have 80 days. 
11 THE COURT: We'll keep that open for a period 
12 of 80 days. 
13 MS. McCLINTON: Thank you. 
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14 THE COURT: Mr. Jonea, I hope you can get some 
15 help this time around. You're remanded to the custody 
18 of the sheriff to await transportation to the Department 
17 of Corrections. Anything further In this matter, 
18 Mr. Naftz? 
19 MR. NAFTZ: Nothing funher, your Honor. 
20 Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Ma. McCllnton? 
22 MS. McCLINTON: No, your Honor. Thank you. 
23 (Metter adjoumed.) 
24 
25 
